A Case for Indian Space Advisory Group

The US’ sway on the international interest for human presence and operations on the Moon has been reiterated with the initial success of its Artemis Accords. Eight of the US’ strategic partners – Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom – have agreed to formally participate in the Artemis Accords. Although India, France, Russia, and Germany share cordial space relations with the US, none of these three space-capable countries is part of this agreement. The Artemis Accord can foster best practices and codes of conduct for lunar human and robotic presence and operations, aligning with the common goals of the alliance. But on the other hand, there is a latent possibility that a contra alliance with competing goals will come up, potentially led by China. In all likelihood, selenopolitics (the geopolitics of the Moon) is fast becoming an extension of terrestrial geopolitics.

The 2011 Chinese Exclusion Policy of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has been sharpened due to the ongoing U.S.-China Cold War. China has focused single-mindedly on lunar exploration over the past thirteen years, as evident from its five consecutive Chang’e robotic missions to the Moon. Not stopping there, three Chang’e robotic missions are planned until 2024, and China aims to send crewed missions to the Moon by 2035. These frequent missions reflect the full range of China's ambitions for the Moon. It aims to become the largest beneficiary of the Earth-Moon connectivity megaproject, which both selenopolitical factions are vying for. This megaproject will include fast interplanetary transportation systems, space stations, low-latency interplanetary telecommunications, lunar surface and low-altitude transportation, lunar surface power generation, lunar surface habitats for human presence, and other exploration infrastructure. Where the recently publicised China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s concept of an Earth-Moon Special Economic Zone hints at this development, Artemis Accords-related progress is making it explicit. The U.S., along with its Artemis Accord partners, has steadily increased public-private synergies in developing various aspects of the lunar connectivity infrastructure. Recently, the U.S.’ renowned industrial R&D institution Bell Labs, currently known as Nokia Bell Labs, has come forward to provide mission-critical, robust, and reliable telecommunications infrastructure, including 4G long-term evolution (LTE), to be made operational on the Moon. Likewise, the U.S. Department of Energy has stepped in to provide robust power solutions, including the use of nuclear radioisotope thermoelectric generators, for systems and habitats that will be established on the Moon. The U.S. benefits from its technically robust industrial labs and companies, as it, even today, has an upper edge over China, which is yet to develop strong international partnerships. The declining global confidence in Beijing, stemming from its lackadaisical management of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, is expected to impact its space diplomatic pursuits in the long run. Although China is attempting to build confidence by pursuing an accommodative lunar diplomacy through its Chang’e programme, it has been able to attract payload and ground-station support from many European countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and France, as well as from new space players such as Saudi Arabia and Argentina. Where a strong Artemis-like China-led alliance seems unlikely, Beijing can perhaps engage with many countries bilaterally by offering its technical expertise and asserting its economic might. The lunar pasture is greening with every passing month, and India has neither been courted by the U.S. nor China. It is understood that the U.S. respects and comprehends India’s strategic autonomy in outer space; however, China is certainly not interested in extending space partnerships with countries that do not concur with its geopolitical ambitions. In any case, India’s lunar aspirations continue to be mostly science-driven and not contemporaneous with the fast-moving changes that involve heavy industry and international partners. This article presents the following diagnosis and makes a pointed recommendation.

  India’s both Chandrayaan missions, Chandrayaan-1 (2008) and Chandrayaan-2 (2019) have been contemporaneous in terms of basic scientific investigations with other space agencies. However, a science-driven lunar programme will not address the growing selenopolitical urgencies. India must gain greater experience with robotic and crewed operations on the Moon’s surface and become a key stakeholder in the development of interplanetary connectivity infrastructure. The Space Commission, India’s top-most space strategic decision-making committee, needs to be bolstered with a conjoined body – a National Space Advisory Group (NSAG) – that can carry out unconstrained, objective, and self-reliant analyses in India’s national interests and fill the strategy lacunae that are out of the bounds of ISRO’s science-driven mandate. The arrangement between the Space Commission and the NSAG can be modelled after the National Security Council and the National Security Advisory Board, which are composed of non-governmental experts. The NSAG can include technocrats, professionals from high-technology industries, professionals from applied scientific organisations, independent analysts and academics. It can be mandated to contribute to research and analyses for swifter and precision-driven decision-making that rests with the Space Commission. The apex commission can further direct the agreed-upon recommendations to the Department of Space, ISRO, the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), New Space India Limited (NSIL), as well as the broader space science and technology ecosystem. In the coming decades, the Moon is bound to host numerous exclaves belonging mostly to alliances. These exclaves will be built through domestic public-private synergies as well as those between allies. Space agencies will cede substantial tracts of R&D responsibilities to industries, startups and private institutions, to acquire a greater role as a regulator and facilitator. With this prognosis, an empowered NSAG can continuously monitor global space-related political, industrial, scientific, and economic developments and assist the Space Commission and the Prime Minister’s Office in promoting national interests in outer space. India’s planetary exploration plans must be augmented by concurrently developing an interplanetary infrastructure. That is where the future of the global space economy lies.